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Recent improvements in effectiveness and accuracy of the emerging field
of automated deception detection and the associated potential of language
technologies have triggered increased interest in mass media and general
public. Computational tools capable of alerting users to potentially
deceptive content in computer–mediated messages are invaluable for
supporting undisrupted, computer–mediated communication and
information practices, credibility assessment and decision–making. The
goal of this ongoing research is to inform creation of such automated
capabilities. In this study we elicit a sample of 90 computer–mediated
personal stories with varying levels of deception. Each story has 10
associated human deception level judgments, confidence scores, and
explanations. In total, 990 unique respondents participated in the study.
Three approaches are taken to the data analysis of the sample: human
judges, linguistic detection cues, and machine learning. Comparable to
previous research results, human judgments achieve 50–63 percent
success rates, depending on what is considered deceptive. Actual
deception levels negatively correlate with their confident judgment as
being deceptive (r = 0.35, df = 88, ρ = 0.008). The highestperforming
machine learning algorithms reach 65 percent accuracy. Linguistic cues
are extracted, calculated, and modeled with logistic regression, but are
found not to be significant predictors of deception level, confidence score,
or an authors’ ability to fool a reader. We address the associated
challenges with error analysis. The respondents’ stories and explanations
are manually content–analyzed and result in a faceted deception
classification (theme, centrality, realism, essence, self–distancing) and a
stated perceived cue typology. Deception detection remains novel,
challenging, and important in natural language processing, machine
learning, and the broader library information science and technology
community.
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A half truth is a whole lie.
Yiddish proverb
The trouble with lying and
deceiving is that their
efficiency depends entirely
upon a clear notion of the
truth that the liar and
deceiver wishes to hide.
Hannah Arendt (1906–
1975)
Introduction
Recently mass media has shown acute interest to the topic of discerning
truth from deception in computerized ways. This interest may be
explained by recent advances in the research and development of
automated deception detection with natural language processing (NLP)
and machine learning techniques. In a recent CBC interview, a computer
science student from MIT’s Media Lab declared his intention to develop “a
kind of spell checker for facts”, called “Truth Goggles”. They are imagined
to be an automated version of Truth–O–Meter (politifact.com) which is a
fact–checking tool powered by the research of many journalists cross–
referencing statements made by high–profile politicians, statesmen,
celebrities (CBC, 2011). A recent article in the New York Times Business
Day section highlights research of several prominent figures in the
computational speech community [1] (Julia Hirschberg, Columbia
University; Dan Jurafsky and David Larcker, Stanford; Shrikanth
Narayanan, University of Southern California; Eileen Fitzpatrick, Montclair
State University) who are “pars[ing] people’s speech for patterns that
gauge whether they are being honest” and “training computers to
recognize hallmarks of what they call emotional speech — talk that
reflects deception, anger, friendliness and even flirtation” (Eisenberg,
2011). The envisioned potential outcomes of these cutting edge
computational abilities are suggested:
“Programs that succeed at spotting these
submerged emotions may someday have
many practical uses: software that suggests
when chief executives at public conferences
may be straying from the truth; programs
at call centers that alert operators to irate
customers on the line; or software at
computerized matchmaking services that
adds descriptives like ‘friendly’ to usual ones
like ‘single’ and ‘female’.”
With the increasing use of computer–mediated communication (CMC) in all
aspects of modern life, deception detection in CMC has emerged as an
important issue in everyday communications, and is now of interest within
the broad library and information science field. Deception is potentially
disruptive in everyday communication, information seeking, and decision–
making. Rubin (2010) positions the study of deception in library and
information science and technology (LIS&T) alongside its positively–
charged counterparts — trust, credibility, certainty, and authority, and
affirms automated deception detection as a recently attainable
contribution from natural language processing (NLP) and machine
learning. Deception is defined in CMC as “a message knowingly and
intentionally transmitted by a sender to foster a false belief or conclusion
by the perceiver” (Rubin [2010]; synthesized from Buller and Burgoon,
1996; Zhou, et al., 2004). Rubin (2010) argues that although largely
socially condemned, deception is widespread and often undetected,
especially in electronic environments where credibility assessments are
difficult due to absence of many traditional cues such as verifiable
credentials or face–to–face contact. The need arises for decision support
tools capable of alerting users to potentially deceptive content:
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Tools to detect deceit from language use.
pose a promising avenue for increasing the
ability to distinguish truthful transmissions,
transcripts, intercepted messages,
informant reports and the like from
deceptive ones. [2]
Human language technologies (used here synonymously with NLP) are
said to be “dramatically improving in their effectiveness and accuracy,
which is accompanied by a significant expansion of the HLT community
itself” (Wyner and Branting, 2011). A new specialized workshop is put
forward as a part of the 2012 Conference of the European chapter of the
Association for Computational Linguistics calling, with great optimism,
upon new methods in the area, and announcing “a relatively new area of
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applied computational linguistics that has broad applications in business
fraud and online misrepresentation, as well police and security work”
(European chapter of the Association for Computational Linguistics [EACL],
2012).
To inform the creation of such emerging deception detection tools, our
current study uses a training dataset and a variety of analytic techniques
and metrics to investigate predictors of deception, as expressed in
subjective participant explanations and, more importantly, in the objective
content of the texts. We draw on our expertise in the related area of
subjectivity and sentiment analysis or opinion mining (see Pang and Lee
[2008] for an overview). In particular, the first author’s previous
experience is in emotion identification (Rubin, et al., 2004), analysis of
statement certainty levels (absolute, high, moderate, low or uncertain)
(Rubin, 2007; 2010a), weblog credibility assessment (Rubin and Liddy,
2006), identification of trust and distrust (Rubin, 2009), and selective
manual blog mining of serendipitous accounts (Rubin, et al., 2011). Our
previous studies model and acquire “reliable cues for recognizing complex
phenomena which are, at least partly, expressed through language” in
order to improve access to information by developing methods for
applications that can approach human–like understanding of texts through
NLP (Language & Information Technology Research Lab, 2012).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we outline the
study goals within textbased CMC environments and provide a literature
overview focusing on both human and automated abilities to discern truths
from lies [3]. Then, we describe our dataset elicitation procedures,
introduce the experiments with the use of human judgments as a
benchmark, and overview our methods, techniques, and measures. We
conclude with error analysis that allows us to create the deception
classification. We reflect upon encountered challenges, provide alternative
paths towards solving the problem of automated deception detection. We
start with a set of research objectives.

Study objectives
In order to be able to discern deceptive messages from truthful ones
automatically, we require a) an elicitation technique for obtaining samples
of both deceptive and truthful messages in CMC; b) “gold standard”
results for comparisons of best human efforts to automated attempts for
the sample dataset; c) analytical methods (including detection cues)
capable of discerning one type of messages from another; and, d)
although outside of the scope of this article, algorithms re–creating
analytical methods and developed language models. Using these steps in
the research process as a guideline, we aim to answer the following
research questions that enable successful development of techniques for
deception detection:
1. Does eliciting data in CMC impact the
results of deception detection (by humans
or algorithmically)?
2a. How well do human judges perform
their task of lie–truth discrimination in CMC?
2b. Given two conditions for the task of
discernment — a set of truthful and a set of
deceptive messages, which ones are human
judges better at identifying (with the least
amount of false positive and false
negatives)?
3. How do two automated types techniques
(machine learning algorithms and linguistic
feature extraction) compare among
themselves, and to the human “gold
standard”?
4. And, how feasible is the automation of
the discovered differences?
In this study we reflect on each necessary step, as we create the sample
dataset, and subject it to comparative analysis automatically and with
human judges, highlighting practical and conceptual difficulties. The
following section provides background on the topic. We review select
relevant studies: summarizing the current theory on human abilities to
discriminate truths from deception, the recent achievements in automated
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deception detection, and setting new conceptual points of interest for
empirical explorations and automation efforts.

Background
Lie–truth discrimination by human judges
When deceptive behaviors (both verbal and nonverbal) are studies in the
fields of interpersonal psychology and communication, respondents are
typically asked to distinguish deceptive statements from truthful ones, in a
so–called “lie–truth discrimination task”. The outcome the research has
repeatedly shown is that people are generally not very good at
distinguishing between truthful and deceptive statements (Vrij, 2000). On
average, when scored for accuracy, people succeed only about half of the
time (Frank, et al., 2004). In a meta“analytical review of over 100
experiments with over 1,000 participants, DePaulo, et al. (1997)
determined an unimpressive mean accuracy rate of 54 percent, slightly
above chance. In this study, we replicate an overall accuracy since human
judges serve as a “gold standard” or a benchmark for comparison in the
overall task and comparing the rate of “false positive” answer: are
respondents more likely to err when stories are truly truthful, or when
they are really deceptive.
People may not be that successful in distinguishing lies, nonetheless,
present studies that examine communicative behaviors suggest that liars
may communicate in qualitatively different ways from truth–tellers. In
other words, the current theory specifies that there may be stable
differences in behaviors of liars versus truth tellers, and that the
differences should be especially evident in the verbal aspects of behavior
(Ali and Levine, 2008). Of the three broad categories of perceivable
differences — verbal, auditory and visual cues — the visual cues are least
reliable (potentially due to distractions and misinterpretations) (Wiseman,
1995). “[L]iars can be reliably identified by their words — not by what
they say but by how they say it” (Newman, et al., 2003). In text–based
CMC environments, verbal cues might be the only kind of cues available to
human judges, and after all, those who intend to deceive have to
accomplish their task of through language.
The reasons for systematic differences between truthful messages and
deceptive messages have been accounted by the widely accepted four–
factor theory of deception (Zuckerman, et al., 1981):
... relative to a truthful baseline, deception
is characterized by greater arousal,
increased emotionality (e.g., guilt, fear of
detection), increased cognitive effort, and
increased effort at behavioral control.
Because message veracity affects these
internal psychological states, and because
each of these states is behaviorally
“leaked,” observable behavioral differences
are expected. Further, statement validity
analysis (see Köhnken, 2004; Vrij, 2000)
and reality monitoring (see Sporer, 2004;
Vrij, 2000) approaches presume that
truthful and deceptive accounts will
systematically differ because of differences
between true memories and fabricated
stories. For example, the language used to
describe an authentic memory should be
higher in imagery, emotional connotation,
and contextual information than that
describing an imagined event. [4]
The efforts are focused on finding cues that are unconsciously revealed
during communication, the kinds of cues that might “leak” the deceptive
character of messages.
The idea that “statements that are the
product of experience will contain
characteristics that are generally absent
from statements that are the product of
imagination” is historically known as
Undeutsch Hypothesis ((Undeutsch, 1967)
as cited in Fornaciari and Poesio (2011). [5]
Linguistic predictors of deceptive messages
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There is a substantial body of research that seeks to compile, test, and
cluster predictive cues for deceptive messages. There is no general
agreement on an overall reliable set of predictors. Burgoon, et al. (2003)
state:
Decades of research have confirmed that
there are few indicators of deceit that
remain invariant across genres of
communication, situations, communicators,
cultures, and other features of
communication contexts. [5]
Ali and Levin (2008) echo this concern:
Thus, the published research on verbal
clues to deception reports numerous
statistically significant differences, but the
findings do not seem to replicate across
studies. To the extent that systematic
linguistic–based deception cues exist,
evidence for their existence seems clouded
by the presence of situational moderators.
[6]
Situational contexts for baseline truthful texts are often drastically
different, complicating direct comparisons. For instance, in an analysis of
synchronous text–based communication, deceivers produced more total
words, more sense–based words (e.g., seeing, touching), and used fewer
self–oriented but more other–oriented pronouns when lying than when
telling the truth (Hancock, et al., 2008). Compared to truth–tellers, liars
showed lower cognitive complexity, used fewer self–references and other
references, and used more negative emotion words (Newman, et al.,
2003). In the analysis of conference calls in a financial area, Larcker and
Zakolyukina (2010) found deceptive statements to have more general
knowledge references and extreme positive emotions, and also fewer self–
references, extreme negative emotions, as well as certainty and hesitation
words. In an interrogation context, Porter and Yuille (1996) found three
significantly reliable, verbal indicators of deception (out of the 18 verbal
cues derived from Statement Validity Analysis techniques used in law
enforcement for credibility assessments): amount of detail reported,
coherence, and admissions of lack of memory. In their mock theft
experiment study, Burgoon and colleagues (2003) did not show
statistically significant differences between deceptive and truthful texts,
but they were able to identify a trend from profile plots:
... deceivers’ messages were briefer (i.e.,
lower on quantity of language), were less
complex in their choice of vocabulary and
sentence structure, and lack specificity or
expressiveness in their text–based chats.
This is consistent with profiles found in non–
verbal deception research showing
deceivers tend to adopt, at least initially, a
fairly inexpressive, rigid communication
style with “flat” affect. It appears that their
linguistic behavior follows suit and also
demonstrates their inability to create
messages rich with the details and
complexities that characterize truthful
discourse. Over time, deceivers may alter
these patterns, more closely approximating
normal speech in many respects. But it is
possible that language choice and
complexity may fail to show changes
because deceivers are not accessing real
memories and real details, and thus will not
have the same resources in memory upon
which to draw. [7]
With more evidence for statistically reliable combinations of individual
verbal cues as indicators under appropriate conditions, human abilities to
flag deceptive messages can at least be complemented, if not enhanced,
by automated tools based on natural language processing and probabilistic
techniques. The most valued cues are those that are the least context–
sensitive, and can be subjected to statistical analyses for probabilistic
estimates of deception, and hence, most amenable to automation.
Limitations of current automated deception detection
In the last decade that several studies have undertaken the task of
automatically identifying linguistic cues, other studies utilize pre–existing
predictors of deception for a binary truth–lie text categorization task as
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predictors of deception for a binary truth–lie text categorization task as
another way of automated deception detection. The task is considered to
be challenging (DePaulo, et al., 1997). It turns out that combining cues
may have good predictive abilities in specified contexts (Vrij, 2000). Zhou,
et al. (2004) used nine clusters of 27 linguistic cues such as diversity,
complexity, specificity, and nonimmediacy. When implemented in
decision support tools, three standard classification algorithms (neural
nets, decision trees, and logistic regression) achieved 74 percent accuracy
(Fuller, et al., 2009). Another approach adapted an existing
psycholinguistic lexicon, reaching an average 70 percent classifier
accuracy (Mihalcea and Strapparava, 2009).
Achieving decent predictive ability comes at a price of non–
generalizability. When creating a test dataset by eliciting truthful and
deceptive messages from study participants, researchers need to specify
the context, the topic, the message format and length, restricting
experiments to fairly rigid ‘incubator environments’. For instance, Mihalcea
and Strapparava (2009) who specified the context of a debate in which
opinions are argued, chose three popular topics, such as the pro–life
versus pro–abortion argument, and asked the participants to argue for
their true point of view as well as the opposing one. The latter would
inevitably be deceptive since it would not match their true beliefs. In our
current study, we leave the context and topic of the elicited personal
stories intentionally open–ended, simply asking participants for a story
rich in details and specifying a suggested length.
Previously discussed studies flag the presence of general deceptiveness
within a message. One study is unique in the sense of adding a finer level
of granularity — which propositions may be deceptive. Using a corpus of
criminal statements, police interrogations and legal testimonies,
Bachenko, et al. (2008) manually annotated each proposition in text for its
truth or falsity. Their classification and regression tree–based automatic
tagger performed well on test data (average 68.6 percent recall and 85.3
percent precision) when compared to the performance of human taggers
on the same subset. We see a great potential at distinguishing deception
within finer discourse levels, such as individual sentences, partial
statements, or phrases, and calls for further research in this direction. For
instance, an e–mail solicitation from a company representative may be
truthful about the company name and location as well as the fact of a
promotional sale, but may conceal or obscure the sale conditions or return
policies. Our study re–defines the task of deception detection at a within–
message level with the goal of identifying what message segments might
exactly be deceptive, and in what respect.
Another finer level of granularity in deception detection analysis may come
from the gradations of truths and lies. In the context of credibility
assessments in law enforcement, participants were asked to use a non–
binary distinction by providing either a truthful alibi, a partially deceptive
account, a completely false alibi, or a truthful confession regarding theft
(Porter and Yuille, 1996). There are currently no automatic deception
detection studies, to the best of our knowledge, addressing the possibility
of distinguishing discrete, non–binary degrees of truth. Neither do the
above discussed automatic detection studies attempt to decipher the
nature of deceptive content in texts.
To summarize, the above automated approaches show promise in
distinguishing deception, even at somewhat better rates than humans. In
this study we further explore the phenomenon of qualitative differences
between deceptive and truthful messages, their perception by human
judges and linguistic cue predictive abilities under an unspecified context
or message topic in CMC environments. Acknowledging the extreme
difficulty in the binary prediction task, our study raises the issues of non–
binary deception categorization and scales, as well as the categorization of
types of deception content. Such questions pose further challenges in the
field of automated deception detection, and we attempt to explore various
degrees of deception on the truth–deception continuum, and increase our
understanding of the phenomenon by categorizing dimensions of context–
based variability within messages.

Data collection methods
Deceptive story elicitations (Phase 1)
In Phase 1 of this study, we elicited personal stories using Amazon’s
online survey service, Mechanical Turk (www.mturk.com). The data
collection instrument requested each respondent to write a rich unique
short story which may be completely truthful, or contain some degree of
deception. Each contributing respondents rated his or her message with a
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deception level using a Likhert scale of 1 (completely truthful) through 7
(completely deceptive). Examples below illustrate the two extremes:
Example 1 (self–rank 1 = completely
truthful): “Once I accidentally ate my own
tooth. I had a leftover baby tooth that
hadn’t come out when the adult one grew in
— it just got pushed to the inside — and it
had been wearing away in my mouth for a
while. One day when I was eating some
chicken nuggets, I bit down on something
hard. I thought it was a crunchy bit of
chicken breading, so I chewed it up. A
minute later I tasted blood, and realized my
gum was bleeding. I gasped and said, “I
think I just ate my tooth!” My family, who I
was sitting with, were aghast and disgusted.
But I was glad that I wouldn’t have to have
the tooth pulled out by a dentist.”
The contributor comments: “It was all true,
but it is the most bizarre story I can think of
from my life, so I thought it would be a fun
one to share.” (1NU1Y5QJR ...)
Example 2 (self–rank 7 = completely
deceptive): “Today I almost got in a wreck
on the highway. A guy in a big jacked up
pickup truck was driving stupidly fast,
weaving in and out of traffic and being
totally. I could see in my mirror that was
waving his hands around and flipping people
off, so I tried to get out of his way as fast
as I could. But someone else changed lanes
right at that moment so I couldn’t get over,
so the truck guy zoomed up and tailgated
me, then roared past me on the right. Then
he cut back over right in front of me, but
there wasn’t actually enough room for him
to do it, so I had to slam on brakes to keep
him from tearing my front bumper off! I’m
still kind of shaking a little just thinking
about it.”
The contributor explains: “The whole thing
was made up, though plausible based on
my highway driving experiences.”
(16KB1K2WOC ...) [8]
The seven–point scale establishes gradations within the truth–deception
continuum, without imposing any specific values to participants’ self–
ratings for the categories in between the two extremes. What is a half
truth to some is a whole lie to others, as the Yiddish proverb suggests.
Deception detection task (Phase 2)
In Phase 2, another Mechanical Turk task was set up for a different group
of participants to read one of the stories (produced in Phase 1) and decide
whether the story was truthful or deceptive. Participating perceivers (i.e.,
judges) were requested to elaborate on their judgments and explain what
they believed to be deceptive in the story. This explanatory content serves
as the basis for a perceived cue typology. Regardless of perceiver’s
accuracy in discriminating lies from truths, each sender’s message is
associated with perceivers’ confidence levels in their assessments, which is
thought to reflect cognitive elements of deception cues. Respondents
provided a confidence score each for their own judgment: from
uncertainty to certainty. In total, 900 unique respondents participated in
Phase 2, 10 perceivers per each story.

Data analysis methods
Scales and thresholds
We used three different scales: 7–point, 5–point, and binary. Respondents
writing the stories (the senders) used a 7–point scale to describe where
each story fits on the linear truth–deception continuum. There was no
definitive mapping of the shades of truth, deception, or half–truth in the
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open–ended task: we allowed for respondents to provide their best fit to
the scale with minimal labeling on the extremes. This fits with our
explorative goals of highlighting practical and conceptual difficulties in
non–binary distinctions.
The seven–point linear truth–deception continuum was open to
interpretation by the sender: how much truth is there in a lie? To consider
possible interpretations we created four different threshold settings. The
7–point scale was converted to a pair of binary truthful vs. deceptive
classes for each of the four thresholds (T1–T4), as shown in Table 1.
Respondents’ self–ranking and mapping to the suggested truth–deception
continuum were interpreted in four ways. The T1 setting is the most
conservative separation of the stories, and defines as deceptive those
stories with a self–rank other than one. It excludes from the truthful group
even the slightest deviation from reality (consistent with the Yiddish
proverb in the first epigraph to this article). The T2 setting is more
inclusive, and also considers stories with self–rank 2 as being truthful,
since deceptive content in these stories is still minimal. T3 is the most
liberal setting, yet a rank of 3 still reflects the fact that the majority of
content is truthful. In the 4th setting (T4), 18 border–line cases (self–rank
3, 4, and 5) were removed as borderline half–truth cases, reducing the
total to 72. T1–T4 settings were used to experiment with interpretations of
truth and deception since, as the German historian in the second epigraph
points out, the notion of ‘the truth’ is unclear and depends on what the
deceiver wishes to hide.

Table 1: Thresholds on the truth–deception
continuum.
1
Truth–
Truthful
deception
self–
level
rank

2

3

4

7
5 6 Deceptive Total
self–rank

Number
of stories

39

11

3

9

6

T1
threshold

truthful
(39)

T2
threshold

truthful (50)

T3
threshold
T4
threshold

18

deceptive (51)
deceptive (40)

truthful (53)
truthful (50)

4

deceptive (37)
removed
(18)

deceptive
(22)

90
90
90
90
72

When judging a story, perceivers were asked to use a 5–point scale for
providing a confidence score for their own judgments (1 = totally
uncertain, 2 = somewhat uncertain, 3 = guess, 4 = somewhat certain, 5
= totally certain). The scale is not meant to map to the 7–point scale of
degree of deception. In fact, when making judgments about the content of
the story, perceivers’ task was a simple binary answer to the question: “is
the story truthful or deceptive?”
Normalized perception measure: Deception and confidence
Perceivers’ binary judgments (truthful vs. deceptive) and confidence
ratings (a value of 1=uncertain through 5=certain) collected in Phase 2
were combined to be represented in a single measure where certainty
represented the range of 1–5, and judgment represented the valence.
Positive valence was assigned to messages perceived to be truthful and
negative valence was assigned to messages perceived to be deceptive. For
instance, if a responder was somewhat uncertain that the message was
deceptive, the data point was converted to a value of 4 If on the other
hand, the story were judged truthful, the normalized score would be +4.
Each story was associated with a list of 10 normalized independent
judgments in the range of 5 to +5. To obtain a reflection of the overall
judgment of responders, the average (mean) and most frequently
occurring value (mode) of these normalized score were obtained. These
two statistics were used in a Pearson’s correlation evaluation to determine
whether the normalized response value was indicative of the deceptive
level.
Composite ’fooling‘ success measure
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Each story generated 10 judgments that each either correctly or
incorrectly identified the deceptive value of story. A composite measure of
success ‘at fooling’ was assigned to each story which is based on the
percentage of incorrect judgments from the total judgments. In this way,
the success rating reflects the sender’s ability to ‘fool’ the reader into
believing a plausible deceptive story, or to write a truthful story in such a
way that it would be interpreted as deceptive. A group of stories with a
high ‘fooling’ success rate (80–100 percent of readers guessing
incorrectly) was formed and analyzed separately for the prevalence of
linguistic cues, since these stories were believed to contain unique
properties given their ability to mislead the majority.
Linguistic cues
The content of the 90 stories was analyzed linguistically with the
motivation of determining whether different linguistic cues are present
between deceptive and truthful story groups. Linguistic cues were
identified, calculated, and compared within and across deceptive and
truthful story groups, following the work of Zhou, et al. (2004). In their
study, the occurrence of these linguistic cues was correlated to positive or
negative indicators of deception:

Figure 1: Verbal cues and calculation
explanations.
a. Average sentence length
b. Average word length
c. Generalizing terms (words indicating a sense of
generality)
d. Emotiveness ((total adjectives + total
adverbs)/(total nouns + total verbs))
e. Pronoun count (first person singular, first
person plural, third person singular, third person
plural)
f. Lexical diversity (total unique words/total words)
g. Negative effect (words alluding to negative
feelings)
h. Modifiers (total adjectives + total adverbs)
i. Pausality (total punctuation/total sentences)
j. Place terms (words alluding to physical spaces)
k. Sense terms (words alluding to physical senses
and feelings)
l. Time terms (words alluding to points in time)
m. Uncertain terms (words alluding to feelings of
uncertainty)

Figure 1 contains the inventory of the considered cues and their
explanations. The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) dictionaries
were used as standardized word lists, such as adjectives or generalizing
terms, and a Python script was created to automatically count and
calculate linguistic figures by comparing the text to these lists. From this,
a set of values representing each story’s linguistic cues served as
individual, independent quantitative variables for backward entry logistic
regression modeling in SPSS. The aim is to see whether a linear function
of variables could predict group membership.
Machine learning
In preparation for machine learning experiments with binary text
classification (truthful/deceptive), the data were pre–processed: all tokens
were decapitalized, digits and punctuation excluded. Three datasets were
created. The first by removing more than 500 of the stop wards prescribed
by Lewis, et al. (2004) [9]; the second by removing none; and the third
by removing only some stop words but retaining point of view words (e.g.,
believe, sure, wonder; I, you, us). Four thresholds (T1–T4, Table 1) were
applied to each preprocessed dataset. Two Weka implementations of
machine learning algorithms were used — J48 for decision trees (DT) and
SMO for support vector machines (SVM) (Witten and Frank, 2005). Each
used ‘leave–one–out’ cross–validations to compensate for small data sizes.
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Results
Our dataset contained 90 stories (distributed over seven levels from truth
to deception, Table 1), and 900 judgments (each story rated by 10
perceivers).
Human judgments
Each perceiver–s binary truth–deception judgment was combined with the
perceiver’s confidence value associated with that judgment. Each story
was assigned a median of 10 such normalized perception scores.
Overall average accuracy
When messages with only a self–rank of 1 were considered truthful (T1),
human raters achieved 50 percent accuracy (454 correct judgments out of
900). In the T2 setting, 57 percent were correct (509 out of 900) and with
T3: 58 percent (519 out of 900). When half–truth stories were removed
(T4) from the judgment task, performance showed 63 percent accuracy.
Adjusting the threshold towards more inclusive truth categories increased
accuracy in human judgments. Removal of half–truths improved accuracy
further, yet overall, these measures were not significantly above chance
performance. This does not preclude that there are distinguishing features
(linguistic or other) between deceptive and truthful stories; however,
whatever factors may exist were not consciously perceived in the
judgment task.
Comparison of accuracies by type of messages being judged
The overall success rate with 50–63 percent accuracy can be further
separated using the traditional contingency table in which two access (the
actual self–ranked values and perceived values of truth and deception)
create true and false positives and negatives. Such separation allows us to
see that judges did better with identifying truthful messages correctly than
with detecting deception correctly. For instance (see Table 2), out of 39
truthful stories which were judged 10 times each (n=390), only 27
percent were misjudged as deceptive; while with the 51 remaining
deceptive stories (n=510) the false negative rate was 67 percent,
potentially indicating a truth bias during judgments.

Table 2: Accuracy of human judgments by type of
actual self–rank.
Accuracy of human judgments
based on truthful stories only
Perceived judgments

Actual
truthful

Incorrectly Total
Correctly perceived number
perceived
as
of
as
deceptive stories
truthful
(false
positive)
Threshold
1 (self–
rank 1)

n=286
(73%)

n=104
(27%)

n=390

Threshold
2 (self–
rank 1–2)

n=368
(74%)

n=132
(26%)

n=500

Threshold
3 (self–
rank 1–3)

n=388
(73%)

n=142
(27%)

n=530

Accuracy of human judgments
based on deceptive stories
only
Perceived judgments
Incorrectly Total
Correctly
perceived number
perceived
of
as truthful
as
stories
(false
deceptive
negative)
Threshold
Actual 1 (self–
deceptive rank 2–7)
Threshold
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2 (self–
rank 3–7)
Threshold
3 (self–
rank 4–7)
Threshold
4 (self–
rank 6–7)

(36%)

(65%)

n=400

n=132
(36%)

n=238
(64%)

n=370

n=86
(39%)

n=134
(61%)

n=220

Writing time
The average authorship time was also investigated as to whether it is also
correlated with deceptive level. The analysis is based on the notion that
deceptive stories require greater time due to the need to manipulate
reality, and invent new information rather than report a factual account.
Using the most conservative threshold T1, the 51 deceptive stories were
found to be completed in an average of 7.9 minutes, and 39 truthful
stories took an average of 10.8 minutes — the reverse of the anticipated
outcome.

Table 3: Distribution of mean writing time per
level.
Truth–
deception
level

1

T1 Threshold

truthful
(39)

Mean writing
time

10.8

2

3

4

5

6

7

deceptive (51)
7.3 7.8 9.6 5 8.1 8.4
7.9

Comparing these two groups using a means comparison t–test in SPSS
(T=1.617, ρ=0.109) showed that no statistically significant difference
exists between the assumed time to compose deceptive stories versus
purely non–deceptive stories.
Normalized perception measure: Deception and confidence
Perceivers’ truth–deception binary judgments and ordinal confidence
ratings were combined across all responses. A correlation was sought
between the actual and perceived deception based on the deceptive value
of the story (1 to 7) and the normalized perception (5 to +5).

Figure 2: Plot of negative correlation between perceived deception and
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confidence level.

Using the Pearson’s correlation statistic in SPSS, the test produced a co
efficient value of 3.49 with a confidence ρ=0.008 <0.05, indicating that a
statistically significant, weak, negative correlation exists between the two
factors. This shows that on average, the higher the actual deception level
of the story, the more likely a story would be confidently assigned as
deceptive.
Beyond the factors described here, no further independent dimensions
were investigated as to whether they correlate to actual or perceived
deceptive value. For example, no subject–specific dependency was
determined, largely because subject and theme analysis revealed a high
dispersion among categories, meaning that categories were not sufficient
in size to indicate conclusive findings. Further data collection could
indicate differences between actual and perceived deceptive value which
are based on other story characteristics, such as subject.
Linguistic cue analyses
Truthful vs. deceptive
Per previous research, the proposed linguistic cues used in stories were
expected to differ from truthful to deceptive groups. When truth is
assigned a threshold of 1 (T1), no statistically significant difference was
found. Further tests were performed for settings (T2–T4), but logistic
regression tests remained inconclusive when analyzed according to the 13
cue values (a–m, Figure 1). This indicates that our dataset is linguistically
homogenous. Confounding factors such as sampling methods or task
definition may account for the difficulty in establishing this differential
between groups, since previous work as shown some degrees of
correlation between deception and one or a combination of the 13
linguistic cues.
Success ‘at fooling’
The sender’s ability to fool the perceiver into believing a deceptive story,
or to write unbelievable truthful story was analyzed in two groups. The
first is those ‘high–success’ stories (80–100 percent perceivers judging
incorrectly) and the second is the remaining stories, which had less than
80 percent guessing incorrectly. Contrary to our expectations, the results
of this analysis show that there were no identifiable linguistic distinctions.
Logistic regression failed to determine statistically significant verbal
predictors with the composite measure of the success ‘at fooling’.
Confidence rate
Of the 900 responses, 617 produced confidence ratings of either four or
five, indicating that perceivers tend to place high certainty in their own
judgments. In fact, all 90 stories generated at least one high confidence
response regardless of whether the stories were deceptive or truthful. To
test whether there is a relationship between the linguistic cues used in the
story, and the prevalence of high–confidence responses, a group of 26
stories was formed consisting of those with eight or more responses with a
confidence rating of four or five. As with ‘fooling’ success rate, logistic
regression models were unsuccessful at identifying linguistic predictors for
high confidence response stories when compared to the remaining 64
stories.
Machine learning experiments
In Table 4, percent correct values represent the average over all cross–
validation runs. Weka’s ZeroR classifies all cases into the most abundant
class and was used as the baseline. The Matthews correlation coefficient
(MCC) was used to verify the results. MCC is a balanced measure of the
confusion matrix for uneven sizes (Almeida and Yamakami, 2010), with
+1 = perfect prediction, 0 = average random, and –1 =inverse prediction.
Four algorithms achieved accuracy higher than the baseline with a
moderate, positive MCC value (Table 4, bold), comparable to human
accuracies of 50–63 percent in the task.

Table 4: Machine learning experiment results.
Classifier

Stop
Zero Correct
word Threshold
MCC
R%
%
removal

DT

All

T1

56.67

37.33

0.02

DT

All

T2

55.56

51.78

0.04
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DT

All

T3

58.89

64.89

0.25

DT

All

T4

69.44

46.11

0.36

DT

None

T1

56.67

50.67

0

DT

None

T2

55.56

48.89

0

DT

None

T3

58.89

58

0.11

DT

None

T4

69.44

54.72

0.17

DT

Partial

T1

56.67

35.33

0.03

DT

Partial

T2

55.56

50.67

0.03

DT

Partial

T3

58.89

64.44

0.25

DT

Partial

T4

69.44

44.72

0.37

SVM

All

T1

56.67

52.22

0.28

SVM

All

T2

55.56

46.67

0.12

SVM

All

T3

58.89

51.11

0.08

SVM

All

T4

69.44

69.44

0.03

SVM

None

T1

56.67

56.67

0.36

SVM

None

T2

55.56

57.78

0.13

SVM

None

T3

58.89

57.78

0.07

SVM

None

T4

69.44

70.83

0.1

SVM

Partial

T1

56.67

58.89

0.35

SVM

Partial

T2

55.56

51.11

0

SVM

Partial

T3

58.89

57.78

0

SVM

Partial

T4

69.44

68.06

0.06

Content analysis results
We manually content–analyzed the dataset (per Krippendorff, 2004)
focusing on what stories have in common, and in what respects they
differ. This systematic qualitative account for the variability within the
dataset served as an error analysis and resulted in an empirically–derived
faceted classification of potentially deceptive messages which varied along
five facets (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Faceted classification of potentially deceptive messages.

A. Message themes
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Message ‘theme’ refers to what the message is generally about, or its
subject matter. The analysis showed that messages are distributed over
12 thematic categories. For instance, 31 percent of the stories described a
tragedy of some kind, 17 percent referred to unexpected luck (Figure 4).

Figure 4: Distribution of message theme categories, percentage.

The most prevalent theme, tragedy, described rare incidents which led to
unfortunate outcomes of some kind, as exemplified by a story of a death
after an argument:
Example 3 (self–rank 2): “An African
American woman came to me and said, ‘I’ve
been watching your tutors working with
their students. I have two daughters, older
than most of your students. Can they join
your program?’ I agreed and assigned
individual tutors to each of her daughters.
Every week or two weeks, this mother
would drop by. We would talk of her
daughters’ progress. ... Three months later,
as I was talking to another parent who
knew this woman, I mentioned that the
latter’s daughters were absent from the
program that day. The parent exclaimed,
‘Haven’t you heard? She’s dead. Her son
came around for some money. They argued,
and he shot her.’ Still incredulous, I saw the
sad news on TV that evening. I could not
believe that a woman I have been talking
regularly is no longer here. ...”
(1CFJUOUJ5N ...)
Luck was typically described as an unexpected fortune such as winning or
finding something of value:
Example 4 (self–rank 1): “Once, when i
(sic.) [10] was walking down the street i
came across a $100 bill. It was just lying
there, on the side of the road. I looked
around, and saw no one, so i picked it up. I
was so excited to have found some money.
I hurried home to tell my husband what i
had found. He didn’t believe me, until i
showed it to him.” (1C8TZBLO1T ...)
The identified categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive: 134
annotations were made showing that stories often consist of more than
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one theme. For instance, in some examples evidence of luck is in the
avoidance of tragedy. Money–related stories were not always about
fortunes:
Example 5 (self–rank 7): “I am sick of
being no body. I work hard, be a good son,
good husband, great father but I have not
done anything great other than making the
ends meet. At the age of 58, I just want to
rob a bank or steal loads of cash from the
big shots. Sometime, I dream that god will
give me a chance of finding 50 million
dollars on the road or in my back yard just
for me. ... So, I am planning to land on one
of the millionaire’s building from a chopper
and steal the money. No traces are behind
and this will become a challenge to the
police. At the end, I feel sorry for what I
have done and use the money for a good
cause and give charity.” (1Z4GT47GVP ...)
Supernatural themes included incidents of hearing voices or of alien
abductions. The deception theme described those stories where the author
is said to experience lying or being lied to. The rest of the less populous
theme categories are named according to their subject matter: humor,
sex, sports, or jealousy. Description was a distinct category since it did not
offer a plot but rather described the characteristics of a setting or
situation:
Example 6 (self–rank 1): “... The place is
ancient, has weathered many a hurricane,
and has settled so much that some of the
doors are now cut into trapezoids rather
than rectangles. The room I like the most is
a long skinny one upstairs that I think used
to be a closet. ... The common kitchen is full
of roaches ... and the common bathrooms
are not air conditioned at all. ...”
(1MFHWXB9ED)
There were six cases of deception message themes (Figure 4) within
truthful stories. Speaking truthfully about lying seems to create some
confusion among human perceivers and add complexity to detection
automation. Judges resort to guessing, as in the following example, which
was judged on average as “I’m guessing it is truthful” 10 human judges
(i.e., normalized perception score of “+3”).
Example 7: “So the other day I’m sitting at
home, and I get a call from a carpet cleaner
service that’s offering deals on carpet
cleaning. I don’t need my carpets cleaned,
but I decide to yank their chain a little bit. I
ask the guy ‘Can you get out blood?’ He
says ‘Is it just a little bit?’ and I tell him ‘Oh
no, its quite a bit. Like someone bleed to
death. Oh, and if you clean it up, I’ll pay
you double, but you have to promise not to
call the police.’ He hung up. Bastard.”
The contributor explains: “It’s a true story. I
tried to make a carpet cleaner company
believe I killed someone and wanted them
to clean up the blood and they probably
didn’t buy it.” (1X5WSQPFM8 ...)
This is a complex case in which the judges task may have an increased
cognitive load due to the nested question — is he lying about lying?
Linguistic cues may be misleading in analysis since the direct quotes are
used to in the story to render truthfully how the participant tried to
convince create a false belief in the carpet cleaner’s mind.
In sum, the identified message themes orient the reader to a topic and
provide a thematic landscape for our dataset. Compared to Rubin’s
(2010b) domains identified in blogs, themes are narrower and mostly fall
within Personal Relations or Finances & Insurance domains. They span
across everyday and serious lies, as in DePaulo (1994). Message theme
variability poses distinct problem for both automation and human
discernment.
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The next four Facets (B–E, Figure 3) address properties of deception
within messages, taking into account the variable interpretation of truth
(T1–T4, Table 1). Facets B–E arise from the content analysis of the
messages, senders’ accompanying explanations, and perceivers’
reflections.
B. Deception centrality
Deception centrality refers to what proportion of the story is deceptive,
and how significant the deceptive part is. Messages vary from being
entirely deceptive, to being deceptive in its focal point or in a minor detail
(Figure 3, B). Of the 90 messages, only 18 messages were confirmed by
senders as being deceptive in their entirety. In the following example the
sender claims all but minor details to be true:
Example 8: “I’ve only bought dark lipstick,
two tubes of it, and not from the beauty
store.” (12NG4N9H36 ...)
C. Deception realism
Deception realism refers to how much reality is mixed in with the lie. A
message can be based predominantly on reality with a minor deviation, or
can be based on a completely imaginary world Figure 3, C). Out of 90, 41
senders claimed in their verbal explanations that their messages were
nothing but the truth. The entirely deceptive stories (self–ranked 7) were
often fiction–like:
Example 9 (self–rank 7): “about a week
ago i ran into this guy — he was good
looking. He also was a fast talker. I told him
to leave me alone because I was married
but, he said he did not care. Well the man
ended up following me home. I ran in the
house and told my husband I was being
stalked. He then proceeded to call 911. 911
then told him an officer would respond. The
guy was so nuts he came up and knocked
on my door. My husband answered and
then there was an altercation they began
fist fighting. Needless to say the police
showed up and took them both to jail.” The
contributor explains: “... just something i
made up off the top of my head.”
(ID=1LFVZ5N9IL ...)
The remaining categories were based on some degree of distortion from
the reality.
D. Deception essence
Deception essence refers specifically to what the deception is about, its
nature (Figure 3, D), not to be confused with message theme or topicality.
When explaining his truthful message, one of the senders felt compelled to
clarify that his story was true in many respects, verbalizing how he could
have lied, in principle, about the person or events:
Example 10: “Nothing was deceptive. The
roommate’s name was John. All the other
events did happen.” (1ZO1SPGVAZ ...)
Similar testimonies lead us to believe that message senders are obviously
aware of the underlying possibilities. We subdivided these types of
deception essence into events, entities (a collective term for people,
organizations, and objects), and their characteristics (referring to
qualifiers of both, events and entities). The rest of the essence categories
(time, location, reason, degree, amount, etc., Figure 3, D.) conceptually
align with content questions such as when, where, why, how much, etc.
We hypothesize that certain combinations of centrality (focal point),
realism (reality–based), and essence (events), are more re–current than
isolated uses of deception topics, and thus deserve special consideration in
deception detection efforts. This is subject to future testing and targeted
elicitations. The deceptive piece below describes how distortions of reality
are details of events which are, nevertheless, focal to the message:
Example 11 (self–rank 5): “i moved to
canada when i was 23 years old. i went to
study at a local canadian university for my
bachelor’s degree. on this trip i met a guy i
fell in love with. after i had to return to my
home country in europe our contact broke. i
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still consider him the biggest love of my life.
i am 30 yrs old now.” The contributor
explains: “i went to canada when i was 24, i
went to work, not to study. i didn’t fall in
love with anyone and i didn’t break contact
with anyone after return.” (1EYU7H6RY6 ...)
Similarly, the sender who wrote Example 2 reveals the reality–based
distortion (Facet C) of the event as the focal point (Facet B):
Example 12: “I didn’t have an accident on
the way home.” (1UWFAQB2PS ...)
Thus, each deception essence (event, entity, characteristics, etc.) may
vary by the orthogonal deception facets, either in its centrality to the
message (such as focal point or minor detail) or in its degree of realism.
In the case below, focal events are true but the entity (the man) is
imaginary:
Example 13: “This type of event has
actually happened, but the specific story of
the man from the midwest was something I
made up.” (1XIQHS0LU6 ...)
E. Self–distancing degree
The distance between the message sender and plot characters transpired
as variable dimension across stories, created by misattributions (revealed
by liars afterwards) and by narrator’s perspective (revealed by writing
stories from the first or third person). Misattributions were three–fold.
Authors’ self–involvement was often misattributed (34 percent), where the
events did happen but not to the sender. Events are also often
misattributed to known entities (e.g., friends, co–workers; 36 percent) or
to unknown ones (30 percent) as follows:
Example 14: “The story behind the song is
true (according to Rod), but it was not MY
aunt Maggie. I don’t have an aunt Maggie.”
(1LVQDBTE57 ...)
Narrator’s voice was also distinguished into three categories in our
dataset: first person (88 percent), second (eight percent), and third (one
percent), the latter two signifying distancing from the message.
Stated perceived deception detection cues
Out of 900 judgements, 275 generated verbal explanations describing
cues by which perceivers said they judged deception. The cues fell into
four categories of this data–driven, perceived cue typology: world
knowledge, logical contradiction, linguistic evidence and intuitive sense.

Figure 5: Stated perceived deception detection cues.
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Of the 275 stated perceived cues, half (Figure 5) belonged to perceivers’
world knowledge, including personal experiences:
Example 15: “plastic surgery does not
involve covering some one from head to toe
with a plastic sheet, with a hole cut out
around my eye.” (15I8RA20KV ...)
Twenty–nine percent of explanations pointed to a logical contradiction:
Example 16: “Why would someone steal a
cellphone and the elderly woman had a
cane and was stooping so presumably it
would be hard for her to snag a phone
unless the cane and the stoop were an act
as well.” (1CXLIK31TX ...)
Sixteen percent vaguely referenced linguistic evidence, for instance, in
regards to a story about cricket:
Example 17: “Some of the grammar and
terminology does not make sense.”
(1KRHRTLZ9R ...)
Five percent openly stated a decision based on intuition, relying on
hunches, or impressions outside of empirical evidence. The perceivers
tended not to be very descriptive in unpacking their reasons around their
sense of deception:
Example 18: “It may be a joke. Doesn’t
seem to be a true story” (1BC2H6DL3L ...);
or Example 19: “It just doesn’t seem very
believable.” (12LMYHR57T ...)

Discussion
With the elicitation methods and experiment set–up detailed above,
human judges achieved on average overall 50–63 percent success rates,
depending on what is considered deceptive on the truth–deception
continuum. Judgments of deceptive stories produced more false negative
results that judgments of truthful stories, potentially indicating the judges’
truth bias in performing the task.
One significant finding is that actual self–ranked deception levels
negatively correlate with their confident judgment as being deceptive (r =
0.35, df = 88, ρ = 0.008). In other words, the higher the actual
deception level of the story, the more likely a story would be confidently
assigned as deceptive. This finding is consistent with the Undeutsch
Hypothesis and current theory on qualitative differences in deceptive
texts. In addition, it emphasizes the value of human judges’ confidence
level in relation to the degree of deceptiveness as self–declared by liars.
Such combination makes the trend obvious, implying that even though
humans are not as good at detecting overall deception; its extreme
degrees are more transparent and thus obvious to judges. It would then
make sense to focus further research on defining each category on the
truth–deception continuum, and consequently eliciting more refined data.
What would most people consider a half–truth as opposed to an absolute
lie?
The highest–performing machine learning algorithms in our experiments
reached 65 percent accuracy, but linguistic cues as tested with degrees of
deceptiveness, were not found not to be significant predictors of deception
level, confidence score, or an authors’ ability to fool a reader. This
supports the idea that further methods are needed to combine isolated
predictors into more complex constructs.
Areas for improvement
We further reflect on conceptual and methodological challenges in
elicitation and analytical methods, and identify potential areas of
improvements.
The first challenge arises from interpretations of what constitutes
deception. Half–truths and half–lies inevitably interfere with binary
classification by humans. In general, humans performed better when there
were fewer ambiguous cases (e.g., T4). It would be beneficial if people
could defer to a machine–learning prediction in cases where they lack
confidence, thus future research is needed on finding areas in which
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computational techniques supersede human judgments that lack
confidence.
Second, our data elicitation task was openended, allowing writers to
make choices and us to charter their preferences and existing case
scenarios. This approach served an excellent purpose for surveying
potential context and classifying deception facets (such as theme,
centrality, realism, essence, self–distancing). The heterogeneous data,
however, lessened linguistic predictive power. Previous computational
attempts succeeded with well–defined tasks for eliciting deception about,
for example, an opinion entirely contrary to one’s belief (Mihalcea and
Strapparava, 2009) or the most significant person in one’s life (Hancock,
et al., 2008). In addition, since qualitative types of deception do not easily
translate to linear deception level scales, we propose further research
focuses on the following categories: events, entities or characteristics as a
focal point of the story.
Third, respondents’ awareness of the study goals may have prompted
them to apply extra effort in ‘fooling’ perceivers with truthful yet
unbelievable or bizarre stories. This may have morphed the original intent
of elicitations to an even broader, yet realistic, task.
Two other broader challenges are associated with the experimental
design. The relative unimportance of linguistic cues (16 percent) is evident
from our proposed cue typology. Contrary to the majority of current
computational efforts at the lexico–semantic level (e.g., LWICbased), this
finding resonates with concerns previously expressed in psychology in
regards to how people detect deception in real life (Park, et al., 2002).
Based on their survey, Park and colleagues found that only two percent of
the lies are caught in real–time and are never purely on the basis of verbal
and non–verbal behavior of the sender.
“Most lies were detected well after the fact,
using information from third parties and
physical evidence to catch liars. Some liars
later confessed or let the truth slip out.
Sometimes the lie was simply inconsistent
with prior knowledge. None of these
common discovery methods are available to
judges in typical deception detection
experiments. Perhaps people are not very
accurate in deception experiments because
deception detection experiments incorrectly
presume that deception is detected based
on real–time leakage, since experiments fail
to accurately capture the ecology and
process of deception detection.” (Levine, et
al., 2011)
On the other hand, if verbal cues are still detected objectively — based on
data at hand and in real–time with some predictive power — automatic
technique would have an upper hand over human efforts, ultimately
proving invaluable, especially in CMC environments.
Finally, we offer an insight from the language pragmatics perspective.
Human communication, including CMC, involves complex social
phenomenon consisting of an interplay of language, shared frames of
reference, and culturally specific contextual knowledge in order to convey
meanings between the sender and receiver. A thorough understanding of
deception, therefore, must account for the pragmatic use of language.
Deception involves communicative action oriented toward reaching
understanding, and in such action, the sender and perceiver must share
particular conventions, expectations or presuppositions about the
communicative exchange, namely that the sender’s “utterances are
justifiable in relation to interpersonally accepted roles and norms”
(Mitchell, 1996). As a result, deception paradoxically requires “a shared
system of interpretation and meaning”. Mahon (2008) identifies the
“addressee condition”, which is that when lying it is not merely the case
that the person who makes the untruthful statement intends that some
other person believe that untruthful statement to be true, but that the
person intends that the perceiver believe that untruthful statement to be
true. Without this relationship, the author is not subject to the cognitive
demands associated with deception in more intimate scenarios. In our
experiments, each sender wrote an unverifiable story for an anonymous
recipient, with possibly inaccurate expectations about how the message
would be received; each responder relied on an imaginary author and a
subjective schema of the events being described. Such elicitation
conditions reduce the possibility of shared linguistic conventions and
contextual knowledge that deception demands, and may undermine the
ability of the data to meet the requirements of deception, or at least
separate truth in a significant sense from deception as it occurs in a real–
world communication scenario.

http://ﬁrstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/3933/3170

19/23

11/2/2016

Discerning truth from deception: Human judgments and automation efforts | Rubin | First Monday

Conclusions and future work
Deception detection is a challenging task. With pervasive use of text–
based computer–mediated communication, automated deception detection
continues to increase in importance in natural language processing,
machine–learning communities and broader library and information
science and technology. Tools with detection capability can support
undisrupted communication and information practices, credibility
assessments, and decision–making. Our study shows typical success rates
by humans (50–63 percent) and machine–learning algorithms (65
percent). We established that the higher the actual deception level of the
story, the more likely a story would be confidently assigned as deceptive,
and have seen a distinct truth bias in human judgments. However, we
were unable to find significant linguistic predictors of deception in our
sample, explained, in part, by the challenges encountered. We reflect
upon reasons, and offer a systematic content analysis of elicited stories
and surrounding senders’ and perceivers’ explanations. Such error
analysis resulted in a proposed facetted classification of variance within
deception by five facets: theme, centrality, realism, essence and self–
distancing. Our next step is to devise ways of exerting greater control over
variability, increase and even out sample sizes, and improve measurement
scales. We are considering changes to our experimental design and the
elicitation task in view of encountered challenges, discussed at length in
this paper.
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Notes
1. The work of our colleagues in speech community is not reviewed here
due to our primary interest in texts and verbal (not auditory) cue found in
CMC messages.
2. Burgoon, et al., 2003, p. 91.
3. The terms “lying” and “deceiving” are used interchangeable in this
article, though we are aware of the fact that deception can be
accomplished in various ways (such as equivocating, misrepresenting and
evading), and “lying” as “prevaricating” is a distinctly narrower term (see
Rubin [2010] for the discussion of various kinds of deception).
4. Ali and Levine, 2008, p. 83.
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5. Burgoon, et al., 2003, p. 91.
6. Ali and Levin, 2008, p. 84.
7. Burgoon, et al., 2003, p. 96.
8. Identification numbers are listed for all examples matching database
entries for further inquiries.
9. The list is available at http://jmlr.csail.mit.edu/papers/volume5/lewis
04a/a11smartstoplist/english.stop.
10. The participants’ spelling and capitalization are left uncorrected to
preserve their authentic CMC writing style and habits.
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